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Brown: A True Threat to First Amendment Rights: United States v. Turner

NOTES & COMMENTS
A TRUE THREAT TO FIRST AMENDMENT
RIGHTS: UNITED STATES V. TURNER AND
THE TRUE THREATS DOCTRINE
By: Casey Brown
-

ABSTRACT

The Supreme Court has carved out several exceptions to what qualifies as
protected speech under the FirstAmendment, including true threats and incitement. The majority rule in the circuit courts is that speech qualifies as a true
threat if the speech would be interpreted by an objectively reasonableperson
as an intent to commit serious harm or injury. Most courts apply a true
threats analysis to cases involving a charge under 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B).
Furthermore, most courts do not require that the speaker actually intend to
carry out the threat in order to be convicted.
Although courts have generally treated the doctrines as separate, the Court
in United States v. Turner agreed with the Government's argument that being
charged with threatening federal judges under § 115 is essentially being
charged with incitement. Therefore, this Note argues that the Turner Court
should have applied the true threats doctrine as it was applied in the seminal
Supreme Court case, Watts v. United States, in the relevant Second Circuit
cases, United States v. Kelner and United States v. Malik, and in accordance
with the statutory scheme established by other circuit court cases dealing with
charges under § 115. This Note further analyzes how issues presented by the
Turner case might have been resolved if the Second Circuit had applied the
proper true threats analysis. Finally, this Note calls for reversal and remand
of the Turner case by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and for Supreme
Court clarificationof issues left unresolved by the circuit courts.
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INTRODUCTION

There is a "profound national commitment" in America that "debate on public issues [should] be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen."2
This commitment is solidified by the First Amendment, which protects
the fundamental right of free speech.' As simple as this concept
seems, the Supreme Court has ruled that the right of free speech is not
absolute and has carved out several areas of speech that are deemed
unprotected by the First Amendment.' This Note focuses on two particular areas of such unprotected speech: true threats and incitement.
Traditionally, true threats and incitement have been treated as two
separate doctrines and have been evaluated under different standards.
Nevertheless, in United States v. Turner, a case involving charges
under 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B) ("§ 115") for threatening federal
judges, the Government argued that Turner was "essentially" charged
with incitement despite the absence of any incitement language in
§ 115.' Surprisingly, the Turner Court accepted this argument and
2. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982) (citing N.Y.
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707-08 (1969).
5. Motion To Dismiss the Indictment or in the Alternative Have Government
Prove "Incitement" Under Brandenburg at 2, United States v. Turner, No. 09 CR 650
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convicted Turner under a true threats statute for inciting others to
lawless action. 6 This Note argues that based on Supreme Court precedent and the treatment of Second Circuit and other federal cases involving true threats statutes, the Turner Court failed to apply the true
threats doctrine and should not have ruled in favor of the Government because the Government did not support its argument with the
appropriate case law. This Note further analyzes Turner's case under
the appropriate case law and concludes that if the Court had performed a similar analysis, it likely would have ruled in Turner's favor.
1I.

UNITED STATES V. TURNER:

A.

HOW

THE CASE GOT TO COURT

The Blog

Harold C. "Hal" Turner was charged with threatening three federal
judges in violation of § 115 because of statements he made on a June
2, 2009 blog post entitled "OUTRAGE: Chicago Gun Ban UPHELD;
Court says 'Heller' ruling by Supreme Court not applicable to states
or municipalities!"' In the post, Turner vehemently reacted to the decision by Seventh Circuit appellate Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook
and Judges Richard Posner and William Bauer upholding a "Chicago
ordinance banning handguns and automatic weapons within city limits" in NRA v. Chicago.' The blog post proclaimed:
The federal Judges at both the District Court and now at the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals have intentionally ignored the common language of the Second Amendment and have now
intentionally ignored a clear ruling by the [United States] Supreme
Court on the matter.
All the years of . .. peacefully and lawfully lobbying . . . to achieve

the penultimate goal of finally interpreting the meaning of the Second Amendment, only to have it all thrown in the trash by three

Appellate Judges in a manner so sleazy and cunning as to deserve
the ultimate response ....
Let me be the first to say this plainly: These Judges deserve to be
killed.

Their blood will replenish the tree of liberty [quoting

Thomas Jefferson]. A small price to pay to assure freedom for
millions.

(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2010), 2010 WL 5176887 [hereinafter Motion to Dismiss]; see 18
U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B) (2006).
6. United States v. Turner, No. 09-00650, 2009 WL 7265601, at *2-3 (E.D.N.Y.
Oct. 5, 2009).
7. § 115(a)(1)(B); Motion to Dismiss, supra note 4, at 1; U.S. Attorney's Office,
N. Dist. of Ill., Internet Radio Host Hal Turner Sentenced to 33 Months in Prisonfor
Threatening Three FederalAppeals Court Judges in Chicago over Decision Upholding
Handgun Bans, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION - THE CHI. DIVISION (Dec. 21,
2010), http://chicago.fbi.govIdojpressrel/pressrel10/chl22110.htm.
8. U.S. Attorney's Office, supra note 6; Government's Sentencing Memorandum

at 7, United States v. Harold Turner, No. 09 CR 650 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2010), 2010
WL 5162032 [hereinafter Sentencing Mem.]; Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am. v. City of Chi.,
567 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 2009) [hereinafter NRA v. Chicago].
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This is not the first politically-motivated trash to come out of the
Seventh [United States] Circuit Court of Appeals .

. .

. Shortly [af-

ter the decision in the 'Matt Hale Case'], a gunman entered the
home of that lower court Judge and slaughtered the Judge's mother
and husband. Apparently, the [Seventh United States] Circuit
Court didn't get the hint after those killings. It appears another lesson is needed ....

If they are allowed to get away with this by surviving, other Judges
will act the same way.
The post concluded with Turner's admonishment of the judges for "intentionally" defying the Constitution and Supreme Court precedent,
claiming they should be made examples "to the entire judiciary: Obey
the Constitution or die.""o
The next day, Turner updated the post, adding the work addresses
of the judges, a map, and further promising home addresses and more
maps to be posted at a later time." Turner also listed the "name,
photograph, phone number, and ... room number" of each judge involved in the decision.' 2 Finally, the updated entry "displayed a picture of the Dirksen Federal Building in Chicago, Illinois, the location
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit," complete with arrows indicating "Anti-truck bomb barriers," along with a
map showing the location of the building."
B.

The Defendant

Turner, a blogger and Internet radio talk show host (or "shock
jock," as he is frequently referred to), has become a central figure in a
decision that may have significant ramifications for First Amendment
jurisprudence. While one of his attorneys described him as a "family
man" with a "reputable" character who posed "no danger" to society,
a "Harold Turner" Google search suggests that, to the general public,
Turner's name is synonymous with "white supremacist" and "neoNazi."14 Interestingly, Turner served as an FBI informant for several
years, although the Government is quick to point out in its Sentencing
Memorandum that his services to the FBI were a direct result of his
"popularity with and access to white supremacist groups."" Despite
such "celebrity" status with such groups, Turner did provide the FBI
with valuable information, as evidenced by the FBI's report that Tur9. Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint at 3-4, United States v. Turner,
No. 09 CR 542 (N.D. Ill. June 24, 2009) [hereinafter Affidavit].
10. Id. at 4.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 4-5.
13. Id. at 5.
14. Transcript of Arraignment and Detention Hearing Before the Honorable
Magistrate Judge Martin C. Ashman at 22: 18-20, 23: 2-3, United States v. Turner,
No. 09 CR 542 (N.D. Ill. July 28, 2009) [hereinafter Transcript].
15. Sentencing Mem., supra note 8, at 7.
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ner's value as a source "outweigh[ed] the discomfort associated with
[his] rhetoric" because his "unique access provide[d] important intelligence which, if lost, would be irreplaceable." 6 Turner has admitted to
making the challenged statements for which he was convicted but has
defended from the beginning that the statements are nothing more
than "political hyperbole.""
C.

The Case

Turner was convicted on August 13, 2010, in the Eastern District of
New York for "threatening three United States judges with the intent
to impede, intimidate, or interfere with the performance of their official duties or to retaliate against them for performance of their duties," in violation of § 115, based on the statements he made on his
blog." He was convicted in the third trial in the case, the first two
ending in mistrials because the juries "deadlocked."" The Government's case rested primarily on the assertion that a true threat is
equivalent to incitement and may thus be analyzed under Brandenburg v. Ohio.2 0 Claiming that Turner was "effectively charged with
inciting" harm to the Seventh Circuit judges, the Government argued
that Turner's "incitement to other people .

.

. who he trie[d] to per-

suade to commit crimes of violence" was particularly troubling because Turner's readers "are the sort of people who are interested in
listening to someone talk at length about how to carry out the
murders and significantly reduce the chances of being caught."' The
defense countered that the incitement doctrine should not apply to
Turner's case, considering the language of the statute, and that his
"vehement, scathing, caustic statements ... are protected by the First
Amendment." 22
The Government's argument ultimately prevailed, as evidenced by
Judge Walter's October 25, 2010 opinion, denying Turner's Motion to
Dismiss the Indictment, in which the Court held that in denying Turner's motion, there was "no suppression of free speech" because Turner's "actions [were] sufficient to incite or urge lawlessness" and
Turner further "provided exact information to facilitate the threat." 23
16. Exhibit B at 3-4, United States v. Turner, No. 09 CR 542 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 27,
2009).
17. Transcript,supra note 14, at 11:14-16, 21:24.
18. United States v. Turner, No. 09-00650, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99795, at *1

(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2010); Peter J. Sampson, Shock Jock Hal Turner Gets 33-Month
Prison Sentence, NORTHJERSEY.COM, Dec. 21, 2010, http://www.northjersey.com/
news/crime courts/122110 Shock-jockHalTurnergets 33-month-prison-sentence.
html; see 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B) (2006).
19. Sampson, supra note 18.
20. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 5, at 2.
21. Id. at 2-3.
22. Id. at 4.
23. United States v. Turner, No. 09-00650, 2009 WL 7265601, at *2-3 (E.D.N.Y.
Oct. 5, 2009).
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In reaching the decision, the Court considered the issue of "whether,
as a matter of law, the alleged 'threats' are protected from prosecution
by the First Amendment of our Constitution." 24 The Court, citing
Virginia v. Black, defined the test for whether a statement is a "true
threat" as a determination of whether the challenged statement is a
"serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence
to a particular individual or groups of individuals."2 5 In evaluating
whether Turner's statements were true threats, the Court considered
several different factors, including the public method of dissemination
of the statements, the context of the statements, and the potential audience. 26 Although Turner supported his argument that his statements were not intended to incite imminent lawless action by noting
that his statements about judges in Illinois were posted in New Jersey
and that "he did not actually stand outside of the Courthouse urging a
group of supporters to rush the Courthouse and attack the Judges,"
Judge Walter rejected this argument:
In the world in which we live, speech has no geographical boundaries. The fact that Defendant issued his statements on his blog
rather than in person only served to ensure that an indefinite audience had access to his remarks, and enlarged the group of individuals subject to incitement. 27
The Court went on to explain that the extremely public and accessible
nature of the Internet made Turner's statements all the more likely to
incite readers to lawless action. The Court also considered the context
in which the statements were made, citing multiple, previously committed acts of violence against both state and federal judges.28 The
Court concluded that, in light of Turner's posting the "victims"' pictures, addresses, and maps of their locations, "it cannot be said that
Defendant's statements are unlikely to incite imminent lawless action."2 9 Finally, Judge Walter indicated that the "Court cannot ignore
the audience to whom the alleged threats were communicated," pointing out that Turner's name typically turned up in "a plethora of blogs
and web pages overflowing with hate filled speech" and advocating
similar action by "like-minded individuals." 3 0 Thus, it can be inferred
that Judge Walter agreed with the Government's argument that since
typical supporters of Turner tended to be more violent in nature, this
made it more likely that his statements would incite his "like-minded"
audience to lawlessness.3 1
24.
25.
"cross
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at *1.
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 367 (2003) (holding that Virginia's ban on
burning with intent to intimidate" did not violate the First Amendment).
Turner, 2009 WL 7265601, at *2-3.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *2-3.
Id.
Id.
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Considering the factors discussed above, Judge Walter concluded
"as a matter of law, that the First Amendment does not protect Defendant from prosecution under the specific facts presented in this
case."" Judge Walter indicated that Turner's statements crossed a
line drawn "for the protection of society" and "the good of the order."" He concluded:
Individuals are at liberty to criticize the judgment of any official of
the Government, including the Judges of the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals. They may attack their opinion as willfully stupid, ignorant, dangerous, or even insane or any other pejorative available to
them in any thesaurus. They may call for their impeachment, or
even for a constitutional amendment doing away with their office.
There are any number of ways for citizens of this great country to
express their discontent with the actions of their public servants.
Calling for their assassination is not one of them.3 4
Subsequently, Turner was sentenced to thirty-three months in prison
on December 21, 2010.35

lII.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND TRUE THREATS

Although political speech garners a higher level of constitutional
protection, there is a fine line between what will be protected and
what will be prohibited. 36 While the First Amendment does protect
extreme speech, emotionally charged speech, or even speech that advocates violence, it does not protect speech that incites people to imminent lawless action or speech that threatens harm.3 7 Thus, one of
the issues typically facing the courts in threat cases is to determine
whether political speech that strongly advocates or suggests violence
rises to the level of a true threat. If so, it is not protected speech and
may subject the speaker to criminal punishment.38
A.

The First Amendment: Freedom of Speech and
Certain Limitations

The First Amendment requires that "Congress shall make no law
... abridging the freedom of speech."" While it is unclear exactly
what the Framers intended to accomplish by including the free speech
32. Id. (emphasis in original).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. U.S. Attorney's Office, supra note 7.
36. 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 471 (2009).
37. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927 (1982) (reiterating
that "advocacy of the use of force or violence does not remove speech from the protection of the First Amendment").
38. See id. at 928 (indicating that had Evers's speeches been "followed by acts of
violence, a substantial question would be presented whether Evers could be held liable for the consequences of that unlawful conduct").
39. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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clause (besides prohibiting prior restraint, a discussion of which is beyond the scope of this Note), modern interpretations of the Amendment and the various philosophical arguments surrounding its
implementation demonstrate that freedom of speech is an invaluable
American concept protected by the Constitution, especially the right
to freely express political ideas and beliefs. While the theories supporting the free speech clause center around such various concepts as
the search for truth, self-governance, or self-fulfillment, the basic premise of these theories is to provide American citizens with enough
information to make an educated decision or choice, whether it be
regarding who governs the country, whether or not to practice any
given religion, or simply whether they wish to enjoy obscene or pornographic entertainment at home. Regardless of the context, many
Americans would agree that the "government should be under a special burden of justification when it seeks to control speech intended
and received as a contribution to public deliberation."4 0
Even political speech, however, is subject to certain controls. The
Supreme Court has recognized several lines that political speech cannot cross without forfeiting constitutional protection: true threats, incitement, conspiracy to commit criminal acts, and fighting words, to
name a few.4 If a court determines that certain political speech falls
into one of these categories, the speaker is no longer protected by the
First Amendment and is therefore subject to whatever remedy or punishment the court may impose for any damage caused by the unprotected speech.
B.

True Threats and Incitement: The Supreme Court Cases

As Supreme Court majority opinions are precedential in all circuits,
it is appropriate to discuss the Supreme Court's development of the
true threats and incitement doctrines. First, this Section will analyze
Watts v. United States, decided in early 1969, which is the principal
Supreme Court opinion that directly discusses true threats. 4 2 Next,
this Section will discuss Brandenburg v. Ohio, an incitement case decided later in 1969 that is often cited to emphasize the analogous reasoning between the incitement and true threats doctrines.4 3
1. True Threats: Watts v. United States, 1969
In Watts v. United States, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction of Robert Watts for allegedly making threatening statements at a
political rally, holding that such statements must be interpreted
40. Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHn. L. REV. 255, 306 (1992).
41. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969).
42. Id. (holding that statements of Watts were protected speech under the true
threats doctrine).
43. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (holding Ohio statute that punished advocacy of violence unconstitutional).
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"against the background of a profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,
and wideopen, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials."44 Watts was convicted of threatening the President under 18
U.S.C. § 871(a), "which prohibit[ed] any person from 'knowingly and
willfully .

.

. [making] any threat to take the life of or to inflict bodily

harm upon the President of the United States.'"' At a political gathering in protest of police brutality, an official overheard Watts proclaiming to his discussion group: "If they ever make me carry a rifle
the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J."4 6 Although the
Court did not explicitly define "threat" as it was used in § 871(a), it
found that Watts's statement was not a "true" threat, considering several factors: 1) the context in which the alleged threat was made; 2)
whether the alleged threat was made in public or in private; 3) the
speaker's intent; 4) whether the alleged threat was conditional in nature; and 5) the crowd's reaction to the alleged threat.4 7 The Court
emphasized that the alleged threat was made in a small discussion
group in a public political gathering and that Watts's intent could be
inferred from the context and conditional nature of his statement: he
did not intend to carry out the threat but to make a political point.48
Although his method was "crude" and "offensive," the Court found
that he was merely "stating a political opposition to the President."4 9
Furthermore, the threat was conditional on Watts's being "induct[ed]
into the Armed Forces - which [he] vowed would never occur."so
Based on its evaluation of these factors, the Court concluded that his
statement was not "the kind of political hyperbole . . . [that] fits" the
true threats doctrine." While the Supreme Court did not specifically
articulate a test in Watts for determining whether speech constitutes a
true threat, the factors it considered are significant and provide a
framework for evaluating subsequent true threats cases.
2.

Incitement: Brandenburg v. Ohio, 1969

In Brandenburgv. Ohio, the Supreme Court overturned the conviction of Clarence Brandenburg, "a leader of a Ku Klux Klan group,"
for promoting "the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime" and for voluntarily assembling in groups formed to teach or advocate criminal
syndicalism, holding that the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute under
which Brandenburg was convicted was unconstitutional because it
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Watts, 394 U.S. at 708.
Id. at 705 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) (1917)).
Id. at 706.
See id. at 707-08.
Id. at 706, 708.
Id. at 708.
Id. at 707.
Id. at 708.
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. assembly with others merely to

advocate the described type of action." 5 2 The Court reasoned that the
statute failed to distinguish between speech that incites "imminent
lawless action" with "mere abstract teaching .

.

. of the moral propri-

ety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence" and
thus violated the protections afforded such abstract speech by the
First Amendment." Significantly, the Court pointed out that under
the First Amendment, the government does not have the power to
forbid citizens from advocating force, violence, or law violation "except where such advocacy is directed to inciting and producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.""
While Brandenburg clearly deals with incitement and does not address true threats, the Supreme Court has repeatedly returned to
Brandenburg to support the proposition that the First Amendment
protects speech that advocates force or the use of violence to accomplish political goals." Although it does not have precedential value in
the true threats context, Brandenburg is nevertheless an important
case for the true threats doctrine because it stands for the principle
that speech that merely advocates the use of force or violence, without
more, does not merit governmental intrusion on the protection provided by the First Amendment, a principle that has been reaffirmed
by the Court in subsequent decisions.
IV.
A.

TRUE THREATS AND

18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B)

True Threats Under 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B) in the
Second Circuit

As this Note focuses on United States v. Turner, which was decided
in the Eastern District of New York in the Second Circuit, a brief
overview of the true threats doctrine as applied in United States v.
Kelner and United States v. Malik, two cases decided by the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals, is helpful. Note that these cases post-date
the Watts decision by the Supreme Court in 1969. However, there are
two caveats to the applicability of Kelner for the purposes of this
Note: first, Kelner is a plurality opinion and is thus not binding precedent in the Second Circuit; second, Kelner was convicted under 18
U.S.C. § 875(c), not § 115. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit's exami52. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 444-45, 449 (1969).

53. Id. at 447-48.
54. Id. at 447.
55. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982) (quoting
"mere advocacy of the use of force or violence does not remove speech for the protection of the First Amendment"); see also Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973)
(using Brandenburg test to determine that statement at political demonstration
"amounted to nothing more than advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future
time").
56. See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 928; see also Hess, 414 U.S. at 108.
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nation of political speech under the true threats doctrine in Kelner
provides insight as to how the court would likely treat a similar case
under § 115.51
1.

United States v. Kelner, 1976

In Kelner, the court found that defendant Russell Kelner's statements on a television broadcast were not protected by the First
Amendment and upheld Kelner's conviction for threatening to assassinate Yasser Arafat, leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization
("PLO")." The following exchange took place between Kelner, a
Jewish Defense League ("JDL") member, and John Miller, a reporter
for a New York City television station:
Kelner: We have people who have been trained and who are out
now and who intend to make sure that Arafat and his lieutenants do
not leave this country alive.
Miller: How do you plan to do that? You're going to kill him?
Kelner: I'm talking about justice. I'm talking about equal rights
under the law, a law that may not exist, but should exist.
Miller: Are you saying that you plan to kill them?
Kelner: We are planning to assassinate Mr. Arafat. Just ... the way
any other murderer is treated.

. .

. Everything is planned in detail.

Miller: Do you think it will come off?
Kelner: It's going to come off.... If I elaborate it might be a problem in bringing it off.5 9
Kelner claimed that his statements were not threats because he "had
no intention of actually using force," but only "political hyperbole"
and that he was simply "trying to .. . show the PLO that 'we (as Jews)
would defend ourselves and protect ourselves."'" 0 In evaluating Kelner's claim, described as "most troubling" in the opinion, the court
determined that the critical issue was "whether an unequivocal threat
which has not ripened by any overt act into conduct in the nature of
an attempt is nevertheless punishable under the First Amendment,
even though it may additionally involve elements of expression."61
The court's main concern in criminally punishing Kelner's speech was
that it contained both allegedly threatening language and what the
court deemed "elements of expression" (the statement that Kelner
was "talking about justice" and "talking about equal rights under the
law") that are typically protected by the First Amendment.62 In its
analysis of this issue, the court adopted a "narrow" interpretation of
the word "threat," as used in Watts, and adopted the following test for
57. United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1022-28 (2d Cir. 1976) (plurality
opinion).
58. Id. at 1020, 1028.
59. Id. at 1021.
60. Id. at 1022.
61. Id. at 1022, 1026.
62. Id. at 1026-27.
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whether a statement constitutes a true threat: "the threat on its face
and in the circumstances in which it is made [must be] so unequivocal,
unconditional, immediate and specific as to the person threatened, as
to convey a gravity of purpose and imminent prospect of execution.""
Using Watts as a guideline, the court concluded that Kelner's statements "unambiguously constituted an immediate threat upon the life
or safety of Arafat and his aides."' In regard to its concern for punishing "elements of expression," the court justified its finding, reasoning that even though the threats were "made in the midst of what may
be other protected political expression," Kelner's threats affronted
"such important social interests" that punishing him was necessary.6 5
Although not necessarily relevant to the court's ultimate decision,
for the purposes of this Note, Judge Meskill's concurring opinion merits further discussion. In his opinion, Judge Meskill indicates that his
concurrence is "reluctant" because he is uncertain whether the statute
under which Kelner was convicted (18 U.S.C. § 875(c)) was intended
to include threats disseminated through the media.6 6 He writes that
he believes the case's "precedential value should be severely restricted" because of his concern "about the implications of considering
the broadcast media to be modes of communication in threat cases." 67
He concludes with an implied request that Congress clarify whether it
intended the statute to apply to threats communicated through the
media.68 The significance of Judge Meskill's opinion is evaluated in
Section V.B.1. below.
2.

United States v. Malik, 1994

In Malik, the court found that statements written by Malik in a letter to a United States judge were true threats under § 115 because the
jury found that the statements expressed an intent to inflict bodily
harm, as evidenced by the judge's reaction to the letter and by Malik's
indication that the threat would be carried out as soon as he was released from prison.6 In rough English, the letter indicated that Malik
would cause "two-American Jewish rich person [sic] [to] become
armed robbed [sic] of 20 thousand cash dollars" unless the judge reversed the decision in his case.70 Malik indicated that he would carry
out the threat as soon as he was released from prison and that the
judge should take the threat seriously because his "criminal rap sheet
[was] no joke."" The letter concluded with a poem that likened the
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 1027.
Id. at 1028.
Id. at 1026-27.
Id. at 1029-30 (Meskill, J., concurring).
Id. at 1030.
Id.
United States v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45, 48-50 (2d Cir. 1994).
Id. at 48.
Id.
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judge to "Pharoah" and the judge's decision to the oppression of the
Israelites.7 2 Using an objective test ("whether 'an ordinary, reasonable recipient who is familiar with the context of the letter would interpret it as a threat of injury"'), the court concluded that the letter was a
true threat because the letter called for violence, provided an immediate time frame, and emphasized the seriousness of the threat." The
court also found that the "cryptic and menacing tenor of the letter was
much heightened" by the poem, concluding that it "was of no surprise" that the recipient judge felt threatened by the letter. Even
though the threat was somewhat ambiguous, the Court found that
"there was additional, substantial evidence-the most significant of
which was the recipients' states of minds and their reactions-that
could and did remove the ambiguity by shedding light upon the contexts of the alleged threats.",7 Thus, the court expanded on the definition applied in Kelner by allowing punishment for threats that were
facially ambiguous but in context nonetheless threatening. 76
B.

True Threats Under 18 U.S.C. § 115(a) (1) (B) in the
Circuit Courts

The statute under which Turner was convicted "is one of several
statutes that prohibit individuals from making threats."" Section 115
provides that "(a)(1) whoever- (B) threatens to assault, kidnap, or
murder. . . a United States judge ... with intent to impede, intimidate,
or interfere with such . . . judge . . . while engaged in the performance
of official duties, or with intent to retaliate against such . . . judge ...
on account of the performance of official duties, shall be punished."7
In order to prevail on a conviction for threatening to murder a United
States judge under the statute, the government must thus prove the
following elements: "(1) the defendant; (2) threatened to murder; (3)
a [United States] judge; (4) with the intent to impede, intimidate, interfere with, or retaliate against that judge; (5) on account of the
judge's performance of her official duties."" While most of these elements are straightforward and do not require further interpretation,
elements two and four have required further clarification by the
courts: first, courts must decide how to define "threatens"; and sec72. Id. at 48-49.
73. Id. at 49-50 (quoting United States v. Maisonet, 484 F.2d 1356, 1358 (4th Cir.
1973).
74. Id. at 50.
75. Id.
76. Id.; United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1027 (2d Cir. 1976) (plurality
opinion).
77. United States v. D'Amario, 461 F. Supp. 2d 298, 299 (D. N.J. 2006) ("See, e.g.,
18 U.S.C. § 871 (prohibiting threats against the President); 18 U.S.C. § 875 (prohibiting threats transmitted in interstate commerce); 18 U.S.C. § 876 (prohibiting threats
sent through the mail).").
78. 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B) (2006).
79. United States v. Stewart, 420 F.3d 1007, 1015 (9th Cir. 2005).
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ond, a two-part issue, courts must determine (a) whether the true
threats doctrine requires the government to prove that the speaker
intended to carry out the threat; and (b) whether the statute requires a
specific intent element and, if so, what the government is required to
prove regarding that element.so
Although the Supreme Court has not decided a case involving
§ 115, at least four circuits have construed "threatens" in the statute
"as requiring the Government to prove a 'true threat,"' while the Supreme Court and other circuits have also applied the true threats doctrine in interpreting similar threat statutes."' While the Supreme
Court did not explicitly define what constitutes a true threat in Watts,
the Court later defined true threats in Black as "those statements
where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an
intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual
or group of individuals."8 2 Neither opinion, however, provides any
guidance as to what standard lower courts should apply when evaluating an allegedly threatening statement; specifically, whether the statement should be analyzed from the subjective view of the recipient or
from the objective view of the hypothetical reasonable person.
In applying the true threats doctrine to threats statutes such as
§ 115, the majority view of the lower courts is that an "objective listener" standard applies: the statement is a true threat if "a reasonable
person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by
those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious
expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm" or to kill." However, in United States v. Cassel, the Ninth Circuit expressed concern
that in Black, the Supreme Court's definition of true threats as "statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression
of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence" overruled the use
of the objective standard.8 4 The court in Cassel argued that this definition indicated that the speaker must intend the statement to be
80. See, e.g., D'Amario, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 303 (applying true threats analysis to
conviction under § 115(a)(1)(B) and determining that the statute contains a specific
intent requirement but "does not require that defendant actually intend to carry out
the threat.").
81. Id. at 300; see, e.g., United States v. Davila, 461 F.3d 298, 304-05 (2d Cir. 2006)
(construing § 876); United States v. Martin, 163 F.3d 1212, 1216 (10th Cir. 1998) (construing § 115); United States v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45, 49-50 (2d Cir. 1994) (construing
§ 115); United States v. Roberts, 915 F.2d 889, 891 (4th Cir. 1990) (construing § 115);
United States v. Khorrami, 895 F.2d 1186, 1192 (7th Cir. 1990) (construing § 876);
Martin v. United States, 691 F.2d 1235, 1240 (8th Cir. 1982) (construing § 876); see
also Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (construing § 871(a)).
82. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
83. D'Amario, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 300 (quoting United States v. Kosma, 951 F.2d
549, 551 (3d Cir. 1991)); accord United States v. Cope, 283 Fed. App'x 384, 388 (6th
Cir. 2008) (applying objective test); accord United States v. Watkins, No. 97-3501,
1998 WL 385399, at *2 (7th Cir. June 22, 1998) (applying objective test).
84. United States v. Cassel, 408 F.3d 622, 633 (9th Cir. 2005); Black, 538 U.S. at
359-60.
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threatening in order for it to qualify as a true threat, thus replacing the
objective listener standard with a subjective speaker standard. 5 The
Ninth Circuit examined the issue in United States v. Stewart, where the
court suggested that the specific intent requirement under § 115
"seem[s] to subsume the subjective 'true threat' definition announced
in Black and recognized in Cassel; one cannot have the intent required
under § 115 without also intending to make the threat."" Stewart
failed to conclusively resolve the issue, however, as the court held that
resolution of the issue was not necessary because Stewart's statement
qualified as a true threat under both the objective and subjective
standards.
The Cassel court's interpretation of Black has been severely criticized by other circuits. For example, in United States v. Cope, the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Cope's argument that "it no
longer suffices to ask the jury whether the defendant's statements
were objectively threatening" for a conviction under § 115." The
court distinguished Cope's case from Cassel, pointing out that Cassel
was convicted under a statute that contained no subjective intent requirement." Quoting the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Stewart, the
court in Cope concluded:
In finding that the evidence showed that Cope intended his threat as
an act of retaliation, the jury seemed to do just what Cope asks: It
found that his threat was a "true threat" in a subjective sense.
Surely a defendant who "intend[s]" a 'threat as an act of retaliation'
subjectively "intends" the threat to be a real one.90
The Third Circuit reached a similar conclusion, pointing out that
"since Black, almost every Circuit to address the question of what
constitutes a 'true threat' has continued to apply an objective standard." 9 ' The court held that an objective standard applies and criticized the Ninth Circuit's "apparent inability to determine what
comprises a 'true threat.' "92
Although the Supreme Court in Watts glossed over whether the
true threats doctrine requires the speaker to intend to carry out the
alleged threat, the Court conclusively articulated the rule in Black:
"the speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat." 93 Furthermore, several circuits have held that the threat need not even be
85. Cassel, 408 F.3d at 632-33.
86. United States v. Stewart, 420 F.3d 1007, 1017 (9th Cir. 2005).
87. Id. at 1018.
88. United States v. Cope, 283 Fed. App'x 384, 388 (6th Cir. 2008).
89. Id.

90. Id.
91. United States v. D'Amario, 461 F. Supp. 2d 298, 301 (D.N.J. 2006).
92. Id. at 302.
93. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707-08 (1969); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S.

343, 359-60 (2003).
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credible or capable of being immediately carried out. 94 Whereas the
Court in Watts indicated that it had "grave doubts about" the correctness of earlier findings that speaking threatening words was enough to
imply intent to carry out the threat, the Court in Black simply stated
the rule without addressing whether it meant to clarify the Watts
Court's ambiguous position.9 Perhaps the Court in Black was simply
ratifying what had already become a common interpretation of the
true threats doctrine's intent requirement, as most lower courts had
already been applying a rule similar to that adopted in Black, in spite
of the concern expressed for such a rule in Watts.96
Even without Supreme Court precedent construing § 115, nearly
every circuit that has evaluated a conviction under the statute has
found that it contains a specific intent or "mens rea" element, in which
the government must prove that the speaker made the threatening
statement with the intent to "impede, intimidate, or interfere with a
federal judge while the judge was engaged in the performance of official duties, or with the intent to retaliate against the judge on account
of his performance of official duties." The Ninth and Sixth Circuits
have further held that the speaker does not actually have to communicate the threat to the intended target in order to satisfy the intent
requirement of the statute but may be convicted for communicating
the threat to a third party.98
V.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT, TRUE THREATS, AND INCITEMENT IN
HOW THE COURT GOT IT WRONG

UNITED STATES V. TURNER:

Although the court in Turner found that Turner's blog post constituted a true threat, this Note argues that the case was wrongly decided
for several reasons: first, the court did not appropriately distinguish
the incitement doctrine from the true threats doctrine and further did
94. United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1266 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990); see
also United States v. Stevenson, 126 F.3d 662, 664-65 (5th Cir. 1997) (Government
not required to show that "the threat was credible or could be immediately carried
out").
95. Watts, 394 U.S. at 707-08; Black, 538 U.S. at 359-60.
96. See Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d at 1266 n.3 ("The only intent requirement is
that the defendant intentionally or knowingly communicates his threat, not that he
intended or was able to carry out his threat."); see also Black, 538 U.S. at 359-60
("The speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat.").
97. United States v. D'Amario, 461 F. Supp. 2d 298, 302-03 (D. N.J. 2006) see also
United States v. Smith, No. 1:09-CR-158-JTC-GGB-1, 2009 WL 5174231, at *1 (S.D.
Ala. Dec. 21, 2009) (requiring "proof of Defendant's specific intent to retaliate
against federal officials on account of the performance of their official duties.").
98. United States v. Hinkson, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1355 (D. Idaho 2004) ("There
simply is no requirement in the statutory language that the statement be communicated to the target."); see also, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 420 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th
Cir. 2005) ("A defendant need not communicate the threat directly to the intended
target"). But see, United States v. Fenton, 30 F. Supp. 2d 520, 526 (W.D. Pa. 1998)
("threats spoken to a third party, unrelated and without any connection to the target,
did not constitute true threats under § 115(a)(1)(B)").
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not properly discuss the Watts factors used to determine whether a
statement qualifies as a true threat; second, the court did not follow
the Second Circuit precedential case, Malik, or discuss the Second
Circuit's treatment of political speech and the true threats doctrine
from Kelner; and third, the court did not properly examine Turner's
case under the statutory scheme established by circuit courts that have
evaluated cases under § 115.
A.

The Court's Misapplication of Supreme Court Precedent and the
True Threats Doctrine

The first and arguably most critical mistake that the Government
and the Turner court makes is that neither distinguishes the true
threats doctrine from that of incitement. The Government argued
that being charged with threatening a federal judge is essentially the
same as being charged with inciting others to imminent lawless action
against a federal judge, and Judge Walter seemingly accepted this argument by concluding that suppressing Turner's statements did not
violate the First Amendment because his "actions [were] sufficient to
incite or urge lawlessness." 9 9 While both doctrines do have similar
origins, however, Supreme Court precedent suggests the opposite of
the Government's argument is true: true threats and incitement are
two distinct doctrines. Indeed, while both Bridges v. California and
Dennis v. United States cite the clear and present danger test as it was
articulated in dictum from Schenck v. United States, these cases are
distinguishable as addressing two separate situations: Bridges dealt
with the constitutionality of restricting speech that threatened a strike
in response to an unfavorable court ruling and is thus analogous to
modern threats cases, whereas Dennis dealt with inciting others to join
a violent Communist effort to overthrow the United States government and is accordingly analogous to modern incitement cases. 0 0
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has addressed each doctrine separately: Watts addressed the true threats doctrine and does not mention
incitement or cite Dennis, while Brandenburg addresses the incitement doctrine and does not mention true threats and cites directly to
Dennis. 0 ' Additionally, the Supreme Court in Black lists true threats
and incitement as separate areas where States may restrict speech
without violating the First Amendment.' 0 2 If that is not enough evidence that the doctrines have been and should be treated separately,
the proximity in time of the Watts and Brandenburg decisions implies
99. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 5, at 2; United States v. Turner, No. 09-00650,
2009 WL 7265601, at *2-3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2009).
100. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 497, 503 (1951); Bridges v. California,
314 U.S. 252, 261, 277 (1941).
101. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444, 450 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring).
102. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
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the Court's intention to keep the doctrines separate. The Watts and
Brandenburg decisions were handed down within months of each
other, Watts in April and Brandenburgin June of 1969, and both opinions were issued as per curiam opinions.' 0 3 If the Court as a whole
had intended to merge the true threats and incitement doctrines, it
likely would have done so in Brandenburg. Clearly, the intention of
the Supreme Court was to treat true threats and incitement as separate doctrines. Thus, the Government's assertion that Turner was "effectively" charged for inciting others to imminent lawless action under
§ 115, which allows for punishment only for threats, is erroneous.
Moreover, the Turner court did not analyze whether Turner's statements constituted a true threat in accordance with the factors applied
by the Supreme Court in Watts. Again, the factors discussed in Watts
were: 1) the context in which the alleged threat was made; 2) whether
the alleged threat was made in public or in private; 3) the speaker's
intent; 4) whether the alleged threat was conditional in nature; and 5)
the crowd's reaction to the alleged threat. 0 4
The Turner court misapplied the first Watts factor because Judge
Walter overstated the context of Turner's alleged threats, whereas the
Watts Court limited its evaluation of context to the circumstances immediately surrounding the speaker. In Watts, the Court evaluated the
challenged statements in a much narrower context than in Turner, limiting its definition of the relevant context to the discussion group and
political rally in which Watts made the alleged threats.' 0 Judge Walter, however, unfairly expands the context in which Turner's statements were made, claiming that because we live in a world in which
"speech has no geographical boundaries," the statements should be
evaluated in light of events wholly unconnected with Turner's statements. 10 6 Aside from Turner's analogy to an instance where a federal
judge's husband and mother were killed in response to an unfavorable
ruling by the judge, Judge Walter lists various other acts of violence
committed against judges in the past and, without drawing any connection between these incidents and any threatening statements made
by anybody, abruptly concludes that "it cannot be said that Defen0
dant's statements are unlikely to incite imminent lawless action."'o
The first problem with this conclusion is that it does not apply the true
threats doctrine at all, but the incitement doctrine from Brandenburg.
This is confusing, considering the statute under which Turner was convicted applies to "whoever . . . threatens to assault" a judge, not who103.
104.
105.
106.
Oct. 5,
107.

Watts, 394 U.S. at 704-05; Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 443-44.
Watts, 394 U.S. at 707-08.
Id. at 706.
United States v. Turner, No. 09-00650, 2009 WL 7265601, at *2-3 (E.D.N.Y.
2009).
Id. at *3.
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ever incites others to assault a judge.10 8 But if the court is simply
stretching the definition of a threat to include those who threaten by
inciting others to lawless action, the conclusion is still unmerited.
While it is a tragedy that judges are targeted for their decisions, it
cannot be said that citizens cannot vehemently protest these decisions
by merely advocating violence without being subject to criminal punishment simply because others have chosen to commit acts of violence
in the past. If this were the context imposed on every alleged threat, a
court would arguably never find a context in which an alleged threat
would not appear more threatening, given the constant occurrence of
violence in the United States. This principle is supported by the Supreme Court itself, as evidenced by its statement in Bridges that "an
enforced silence, however limited, solely in the name of preserving the
dignity of the bench, would probably engender resentment, suspicion,
and contempt much more than it would enhance respect.""o' If the
court were to evaluate Turner's statements using a narrower concept
of context in accordance with Watts, Judge Walter's argument fails
completely. Turner's statements were made in the context of a political, public blog, very similar to the political, public rally in Watts. The
purpose of both the blog in Turner and the rally in Watts was to offer
political protest. The Court in Watts did not factor into its context
evaluation that in light of previous assassinations or assassination attempts on past presidents, the threat was more credible. Rather, the
Court found that it was precisely this context that diffused the alleged
threat and gave credence to the claim that it was only political
hyperbole.1 1 0
Although the second factor is discussed in depth in the Turner opinion, it is similarly misapplied: whereas in Watts the public, political
setting of the alleged threat made it less threatening, Judge Walter
flips the factor on its back and asserts that it is the public dissemination of Turner's alleged threat that makes it all the more threatening."' By emphasizing that an "indefinite audience had access to his
remarks" because Turner made the statements "on his blog rather
than in person," Judge Walter implies that the alleged threat would
have been less menacing had Turner made the comment at a public
gathering.1 12 This is a flawed argument, considering that a blog is
analogous to a public gathering in that people may read or not read
the blog just as people at a public gathering may come and go as they
please. If blogs and public gatherings are similar, then it follows that a
statement made in a public forum is less threatening than one made in
a private forum.
108. 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B) (2006).
109. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270-71 (1941).
110. Watts, 394 U.S. at 707-08.

111. Turner, 2009 WL 7265601, at *2.
112. Id.
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Finally, the last three factors addressed by the Court in Watts (the
speaker's intent, whether the alleged threat was conditional in nature,
and the crowd's reaction to the alleged threat) were either misapplied
or not addressed at all: the Turner court did not adequately address
what intent could be inferred from Turner's speech or whether it was
conditional in nature, and most significantly, the Court did not appropriately analyze the audience's reaction to Turner's speech. Although
Judge Walter rejected Turner's argument that his physical location in
New Jersey when making the post about judges in Illinois inferred that
he did not intend the statements to incite lawless action against the
judges, Judge Walter did not analyze further whether Turner actually
intended the statements to be threatening. Turner's defense has consistently been that he intended his blog as a political protest and that
his blog did not constitute a true threat or incitement:
Mr. Turner's statements were an opinion, and did not request or ask
anyone to perpetrate an act of violence against any of the three
judges. Defendant did not ask anyone to take action; he did not ask
anyone to commit a crime; he did not request that recipients interpret his words as an instruction to perform an illegal act. He gave
his opinion, and that opinion is that the decision in NRA v. Chicago
is so egregious and contrary to any rational interpretation about the
purpose of the judiciary and the role it plays in the Constitution is
that its contents and dissemination made its writers worthy of
death. 113
Judge Walter, however, conclusively agreed with the Government's
argument that Turner did intend to incite others to lawless action and
"trie[d] to persuade [others] to commit crimes of violence."ll 4 This
conclusion is troublesome given the court's clear articulation of the
issue in the case as whether Turner's statements were a "serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.""' In reaching its decision,
the court failed to apply this test by completely ignoring the intent
requirement it imposed upon itself. The court found that Turner intended "that action should be taken sooner rather than later," presumably by Turner's intended audience, which would be relevant if
the court had articulated the issue as whether Turner's statements
were a serious expression of an intent for others to commit an act of
unlawful violence." 6 The fallacy of the court's argument is obvious: if
the issue is whether the defendant himself expressed an intent to commit an act of violence, it is not sufficient for the court to conclude that
the defendant expressed an intent for others to commit those acts.
113.
114.
115.
Oct. 5,
116.

Motion to Dismiss, supra note 4, at 8.
Id. at 3.
United States v. Turner, No. 09-00650, 2009 WL 7265601, at *2-3 (E.D.N.Y.
2009).
Id. at *3.
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The lack of analysis of Turner's intent is critical, especially when
viewed in light of the Supreme Court's determination of the same issue in Watts. The Watts Court concluded that Watts did not intend to
carry out his threat but to make a political point, albeit a crude and
offensive one.' 17 Given the analogous facts in both cases, the court
should have specifically indicated how it distinguished Turner from
Watts in analyzing whether Turner possessed the requisite intent to be
convicted under the court's self-imposed test.
The fourth factor in Watts was also not discussed in Turner; however, this factor is not applicable to Turner's speech and thus not as
critical to analyze. The Court in Watts emphasized in part of its analysis that Watts's statement was not a true threat because it was conditional on the event of Watts being inducted into the military, "which
[Watts] vowed would never occur.""' Turner did not make any such
conditional statements, and thus the fourth factor would likely turn in
favor of the Government.
The fifth and final factor analyzed by the Court in Watts was improperly analyzed in Turner because both the Government and Judge
Walter held that the type of audience to whom Turner's speech was
intended was determinative of whether the speech constituted a true
threat, while in Watts the Supreme Court focused on the audience's
reaction. In Watts, the Court pointed out that Watts's statement was
not a true threat because his audience did not take it seriously; rather,
they laughed in response."' While this factor would present somewhat of an issue for the defense to prove (it would probably be impossible to record each reader's reaction to Turner's blog
simultaneously), the lack of violent outbursts targeted at the three
judges after Turner's post is at least suggestive of his audience's reaction. Rather than address this issue outright, however, the court in
Turner agreed with the Government's argument that the "violent and
extreme groups" to whom Turner's speech was directed made the
speech more likely to incite those groups to take lawless action. 1 2 0
Again, this conclusion avoids the issue by applying the incitement doctrine where the court should have applied the true threats doctrine.
Thus, if the Turner court had properly applied the true threats doctrine from Watts, four of the five factors seem to fall in Turner's favor:
Turner's statements were made in the context of a political blog; the
blog was disseminated to the public, allowing time for reflection and
for counter-speech; it is at least arguable that Turner did not intend
the statements as threats; and the audience, though labeled "violent
and extreme," took no action in response to his alleged threats, suggesting that, at worst, the audience simply agreed with Turner. Al117.
118.
119.
120.

Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969).
Id. at 707.
Id.
Sentencing Mem., supra note 8, at 3.
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though this Note cannot speculate as to how the court would actually
determine Turner's case if it were to apply the proper analysis, it can
at least admonish the Second Circuit for ignoring Supreme Court precedent and misapplying the factors used in Watts to analyze allegedly
threatening speech.
B.

The Court's Misapplicationof Second Circuit Persuasive and
PrecedentialCase Law

The second mistake the Turner court made was it failed to apply
Second Circuit case law to Turner's case. Although Kelner is a plurality opinion and hence not binding on the lower courts in the Second
Circuit, it still provides guidance as to the Second Circuit's treatment
of political speech and the true threats doctrine. Malik, a precedential
case, is even more helpful because it provides guidance as to the Second Circuit's treatment of the true threats doctrine to a conviction
under § 115, the same statute under which Turner was convicted.
1. Turner and Kelner
If the Turner court had looked to Kelner for guidance in determining whether to convict Turner, it likely would have been persuaded
that Turner should have been acquitted for two reasons: first, although
the facts from Kelner are somewhat analogous to those in Turner,Turner's speech does not pass the true threats test articulated in Kelner;
second, the concurring Judges mentioned above cautioned courts to
be wary of placing too much precedential value in Kelner when convicting defendants in similar circumstances, which, as discussed below,
significantly helps Turner's case. Like Kelner, Turner's speech contained both political rhetoric and potentially threatening language.
For example, Turner's post included references to "years" of "lobbying" to achieve certain goals as well as to a need to "replenish the tree
of liberty" with the blood of the three judges at whom the post was
aimed; similarly, Kelner's cry for "justice" and advocacy of "equal
rights under the law" was followed up with his confirmation of a plan
to assassinate Arafat. 1 2 1 If the Turner court were to follow Kelner, it
would likely attempt to resolve this issue by applying the following
test: whether "the threat on its face and in the circumstances in which
it is made is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific as
to the person threatened, as to convey a gravity of purpose and imminent prospect of execution."12 A court would likely conclude that
Turner's speech does not qualify as a true threat under this test because it is equivocal and unspecific and does not convey an imminent
prospect of execution when compared to the speech made by Kelner.
121. Affidavit, supra note 8, at 3-4; United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1021
(2d Cir. 1976) (plurality opinion).
122. Kelner, 534 F.2d at 1027.
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Whereas Kelner stated that there were already assassins in place "who
[had] been trained and who [were] out now to make sure that Arafat
.

.

. [did] not leave" the United States alive, which unequivocally con-

veyed an imminent prospect of execution of the assassination of
Arafat, Turner's statements advocated violence towards the Seventh
Circuit judges, but made no reference as to when such violence should
or could take place.12 3 Furthermore, Kelner blatantly stated that he
and the JDL members had a detailed plan already in place to assassinate Arafat; Turner, on the other hand, simply advocated that the
judges deserve death and that they should be made examples to the
rest of the judiciary to "obey the Constitution or die."' 24 While this
language is admittedly extreme and potentially offensive, it is not a
specific, unequivocal communication of an intent to kill the judges.
Under Kelner, the test demands that the statements be so blatant as to
convey an immediate threat of harm; Turner's statements do not rise
to this level and, accordingly, would not qualify as a true threat under
the Kelner test. At most, Turner's statements conveyed a gravity of
purpose: to advocate violence towards the judges for their alleged
wrongs. Mere advocacy of violence, however, still garners First
Amendment protection, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly
confirmed.125
As the Kelner opinion is a plurality opinion and thus has only persuasive value in the Second Circuit, the concurring opinion by Judge
Meskill referenced above is particularly applicable to Turner's case
because Judge Meskill questioned whether § 875(c), a threats statute
similar to § 115, should include threats disseminated through the media. Judge Meskill recommended that the precedential value of Kelner should be "severely restricted" because Congress did not clarify
whether the restraint should apply to such a highly protected mode of
communication, concluding with an implied request to Congress to
clarify this ambiguity. Turner's case presents a similar dilemma and
another facet to this argument that allegedly threatening speech in the
media is not prosecutable under threats statutes, or at least requires
the Government to meet a harsher standard before restriction is constitutional. Congress should further consider whether speech distributed through a public blog on the Internet should also be considered
as exempt or as requiring special treatment under threats statues such
as § 115.

123. Affidavit, supra note 8, at 3-4; Kelner, 534 F.2d at 1021.
124. Affidavit, supra note 8, at 3-4; Kelner, 534 F.2d at 1021.
125. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973); see also NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927-28 (1982) (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S.
290, 297-98 (1961) (holding that speech that advocated the "moral propriety or even
moral necessity for a resort to force or violence" is protected under the First
Amendment)).
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Turner and Malik

Although it is less troubling that the Turner court chose not to apply Kelner, as it is only persuasive and not precedential, the court
should have looked to a Second Circuit case directly on point, United
States v. Malik, which deals with a conviction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 115(a)(1)(B) for threats made in letters addressed to a judge. Although the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Malik's conviction, Turner's case is distinguishable from Malik's. For example,
Malik threatened that violent acts would be committed if the judge
did not reverse the decision in his case, whereas Turner only indicated
that the Seventh Circuit judges deserved death.1 26 Turner's case is further distinguishable from Malik because Malik indicated that his
threats would be carried out as soon as he was released from prison,
while Turner gave no specific time frame within which his alleged
threats should or would be carried out by others or by himself.'27 The
only aspect of the Malik case that could harm Turner's argument is
that the Malik court found Malik's statements threatening even
though they were ambiguously written in poor English; specifically,
the court found that, despite the ambiguity of the threats, the statements were nonetheless threatening considering the context and reaction of the audience.12 8 If similar reasoning were applied in Turner's
case, a court might find that because of the violent analogies to the
"tree of liberty" and the "lesson" taught to another Seventh Circuit
judge by murdering her mother and husband, the context of Turner's
allegedly threatening statements is sufficient to overcome their ambiguity. 129 In determining whether Turner's statements were clear
enough to be threatening, a court might also lend credence to the reactions of the three judges at whom Turner's statements were aimed,
just as the Court did in Malik. 3 0 This Note argues, however, that the
court in Malik should have applied an "objective listener" test, or how
an objectively reasonable person would have reacted to the statements, in determining whether the statements were clear enough to
constitute true threats. A court evaluating Turner's case should similarly apply an objective listener standard to determine whether Turner's statements were clear enough to constitute true threats.
Otherwise, the standard would be too difficult to apply, given the varying sensitivities of the general population.
Strangely, neither Kelner nor Malik appear in Judge Walter's analysis of whether Turner's alleged threats are "protected from prosecu126. United States v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45, 48-50 (2d Cir. 1994); Affidavit, supra note
8, at 3-4.
127. Malik, 16 F.3d at 48-49.
128. Id. at 50.
129. Affidavit, supra note 8, at 3-4.
130. Malik, 16 F.3d at 50.
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tion by the First Amendment.""' If the court had conducted a proper
analysis of whether Turner's statements qualified as true threats,
rather than applying the Brandenburg incitement doctrine, the court
may not have been able to summarily declare "as a matter of law" that
Turner's statements are not protected speech.13 2 At the very least, the
court should have required the Government to offer proof that Turner's case was sufficiently analogous to Kelner and Malik to merit
conviction.
C.

The Court's Misapplication of the Statutory Scheme as
Established by the Circuit Courts

The third and final mistake made by the Turner court is that it did
not look to the other circuit court opinions that have addressed convictions under § 115 for guidance in dealing with a similar case in the
Second Circuit. The general consensus of the circuit courts is that the
true threats doctrine from Watts applies to a conviction for threatening statements made in violation of § 115. 11 Although the precise
definition of a true threat varies somewhat from circuit to circuit, most
circuits apply an objective listener standard and evaluate whether "a
reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a
serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm," regardless of
whether the speaker intended to carry out the threat.134 If the Turner
court had applied this standard, as would have been appropriate in
Turner's case, it would have had to determine whether a reasonable
person would have interpreted Turner's statements as a serious expression by Turner of an intent to inflict bodily harm, regardless of
whether Turner actually intended to carry out the threat. Admittedly,
the court could have come out either way in evaluating this issue.
While Turner's statements that the judges "deserve death" and that
their blood should "replenish the tree of liberty" are ambiguous and
general, he does reference a specific violent crime committed against
another Seventh Circuit judge and suggests that a similar "lesson" is
"needed," suggesting that a similar crime should be committed in similar fashion against the three judges.13 5 Arguably, the reference to a
specific previous act of violence could overcome the ambiguity of the
other statements and would cause an objectively reasonable person to
conclude that Turner's statements are a serious expression of an intent
to inflict bodily harm, or even death. Regardless of how the Turner
court would have come out on this issue or what test it would have
131. United States v. Turner, No. 09-00650, 2009 WL 7265601, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Oct.
5, 2009).
132. Id. at *3.
133. See United States v. D'Amario, 461 F. Supp. 2d 298, 300 (D.N.J. 2006).
134. Id. (quoting United States v. Kosma, 951 F.2d 549, 557 (3d Cir. 1991)).
135. Affidavit, supra note 8, at 3-4.
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adopted as its own, it should have at least acknowledged that Turner's
conviction did not involve incitement and should have analyzed the
case under its own interpretation of the true threats doctrine.
Finally, in applying the statutory scheme developed by the circuit
courts, the Turner court should have also addressed whether Turner
made the statements with the requisite intent to "impede, intimidate,
or interfere" with the Seventh Circuit judges while "engaged in the
performance of [their] official duties, or with the intent to retaliate"
against the judges for their decision in NRA v. Chicago. It is difficult
to understand why the Turner court ignored this requirement, as it
would have been relatively simple for the Government to make the
argument that Turner possessed the requisite intent when making his
statements on the blog. Turner is very clear that his blog post is in
response to the judges' decision in NRA v. Chicago,which Turner calls
"politically-motivated trash."' 3 6 Accordingly, the court would have
been justified in finding that Turner at least possessed the necessary
intent to be convicted under § 115, but instead altogether failed to
address the issue.
VI.

CONCLUSION

It would be impossible for this Note to determine exactly how the
Turner court would have come out if it had applied the true threats
doctrine and not incitement. On the one hand, if the Turner court had
applied the true threats doctrine as applied in Watts and subsequently
applied by the Second Circuit in Kelner, it likely would have concluded that Turner's speech was protected by the First Amendment
because four of the five Watts factors favor Turner's argument and
because Turner's statements would probably not qualify as a true
threat under the Kelner test. On the other hand, if the Turner court
had compared Turner's case to the Second Circuit precedential case,
Malik, and had further analyzed the case under the § 115 scheme established by the circuits, the court could have come to two related
conclusions. First, the court could have concluded that, in light of
Malik, even though Turner's statements were ambiguous, the context
in which they were made rendered them truly threatening and actionable under § 115. Second, the court could have concluded that, under
the statutory scheme applied by the majority of circuit courts, Turner's
statements, though ambiguous, would have been interpreted by a reasonable person as a serious expression of an intent to inflict bodily
harm; furthermore, the court could have easily concluded that Turner
had the requisite specific intent required by § 115. Clearly, both sides
of the argument have merit and the issues should have been argued
and determined in a proper jury trial. Sadly, the Turner court chose to
completely ignore the true issue at hand and only evaluated whether
136. Id.
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Turner's statements qualified as threats under the incitement doctrine
rather than actually determining whether his statements were true
threats.
Given the confusion in the Second Circuit and discrepancies between the circuits, the Supreme Court should step in to define the true
threats doctrine and clarify how it should be applied. For example,
the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have held that a threat in a § 115 case
need not be communicated to the intended target; however, the Third
Furthermore, in his concurring opinion
Circuit has held otherwise.'
in Kelner, Judge Meskill questions whether threats statutes should be
applicable to threats disseminated through the media and calls for resolution of the issue by a higher court or Congress. These issues will
remain unresolved, or will at least be solved differently in different
circuits, if the Supreme Court does not offer its own resolution.
Although Turner's case presents an ideal opportunity for the Supreme Court to offer its own interpretation of the doctrine, it remains
to be seen whether the case will make it that far. In the meantime, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals should overturn Turner's conviction
and remand Turner's case to be retried to determine whether Turner's
blog contains speech that qualifies as a true threat under a proper true
threats doctrine analysis, or in the alternative, whether his speech
should be protected under the First Amendment. "To rule otherwise
would ignore the 'profound national commitment' that 'debate on
public issues [should] be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."""
137. See United States v. Hinkson, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1355 (D. Idaho 2004)
("There simply is no requirement in the statutory language that the statement be communicated to the target."); see also, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 420 F.3d 1007, 1016
(9th Cir. 2005) ("A defendant need not communicate the threat directly to the intended target."). But see United States v. Fenton, 30 F. Supp. 2d 520, 526 (W.D. Pa.
1998) (threats spoken to a third party, unrelated and without any connection to the
target, did not constitute true threats under § 115(a)(1)(B)).
138. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982) (quoting N.Y.
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
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